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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
reliance on the Secretary of Labor support the congressional policy
of allowing unions the greatest possible latitude in handling their
internal affairs. Before the ruling in Calhoon, several district courts
had heard cases alleging Title I violations and had given effect to
this policy, denying pre-election relief and holding that a Title IV,
not a Title I, violation was alleged.4"
Calhoon represents a functional interpretation of the act. It
achieves a delicate balance between union freedom and individual
justice. The Court understood that Congress did not intend re-
strictions concerning candidacy, whether "reasonable" or unreason-
able, to constitute a Title I violation. Both the legislative history
and the policy implicit in the other provisions of the act justify
this conclusion. The act seeks to prevent union abuse in its internal
procedures, not to establish a means of ignoring those procedures.
The Supreme Court, though denying plaintiffs an immediate remedy,
has upheld the congressional policy of relying upon union pro-
cedures as long as they effectively protect the rights of union mem-
bers guaranteed in the act.
GEORGE CARsoN II
Practice and Procedure-Res Judicata in Parent's Suit for Medical
Expenses and Loss of Services
The recent North Carolina decision of Kleibor v. Rogers' re-
states the majority rule that, following an injury to his minor child,
a father is not barred from bringing an action for medical expenses
and loss of services and earnings of the infant when the infant has
failed on the merits in a prior suit based on the same occurrence.'
" Jackson v. National Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 221 F. Supp. 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Jackson v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 212 F.
Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962); Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, 201 F. Supp.
307 (D. Del. 1961); Johnson v. San Diego Waiters Union, 190 F. Supp.
444 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
-265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965). The case arises out of an injury
to plaintiff's nine-year-old son. Judgment for the defendant in a prior
action by the mother as next friend was held not to be res judicata in
the father's action.
I See cases collected in Annot., 133 A.L.R. 181, 201-02 (1941). For other
North Carolina cases see, e.g., Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 86 S.E.2d
925 (1955); Rabil v. Farris, 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938); Thigpen v.
Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N.C. 97, 65 S.E. 750 (1909). The rule was
criticized and the application of res judicata in these cases was urged in
North Carolina Case Law--Judgments, 36 N.C.L. Rnv. 461, 462 (1958).
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RES JUDICATA IN PARENT'S SUIT
However, the court indicated a willingness to change this holding
and bind the father if the defendant could amend and show that
the father controlled the minor's suit within the meaning of section
84 of the Restatement of Judgments.3 If a showing of control
could be made, the court said that res judicata would apply,4 and
the expense and trouble of a new trial to the court,5 taxpayers,
litigants, and witnesses would be partially eliminated.
While in the usual circumstances the father would seem to have,
as the Restatement requires, a "proprietary or financial interest in
the judgment or in the determination of a question of fact or of a
question of law with reference to the same subject matter or trans-
action,"' it is not clear what degree of proof of defendant's control
is required. The North Carolina court, when discussing control,
has talked of the failure of the defendant to show that one not in
privy nevertheless "participated in the trial or that they 'openly and
actively' and with respect to some interest of their own, 'assumed
and managed' the prosecution."' It is clear from decisions8 and
'RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942):
A person who is not a party but who controls an action, individual-
ly or in co-operation with others, is bound by the adjudications of
litigated matters as if he were a party if he has a proprietary or
financial interest in the judgment or in the determination of a ques-
tion of fact or of a question of law with reference to the same sub-
ject matter or transaction; if the other party has notice of his partici-
pation, the other party is equally bound.
'265 N.C. at 308, 144 S.E.2d at 30. For other cases discussing the
control idea see White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959);
Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957) ; Carolina Power &
Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C. 679, 79 S.E.2d 167
(1953).
'One of the chief arguments for passage of the recent bond issue to
secure funds for an intermediate appellate court was that the North Carolina
court's burden is much greater than that of the majority of the several
states. Greensboro Daily News, Oct. 8, 1965, § B, p. 1, col. 5.
'RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942).
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Ins. Co., 238 N.C.
679, 693, 79 S.E.2d 167, 176 (1953). It is suggested that there should be
no requirement of an "open and active" participation in order to bind the
party who controlled the first action, since to do so would be to defeat the
purpose of res judicata and give a litigant two days in court. But when a
party loses to an unknown adversary, he should not be bound. This is the
position taken in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941), where the defendant who secretly controlled
a prior suit in a Nevada federal court was bound by the judgment in a
subsequent suit in a New Jersey federal court, both suits based upon the
same patents.
'Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957); Rabil v.
Farris, 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938).
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from the Restatement9 that acting as next friend in the infant's
suit is not sufficient control in itself, nor is the mere supplying of
funds for the infant's attorney.10 However, both selecting and pay-
ing for the attorney has been held an act of control elsewhere."
It is noteworthy that the North Carolina court makes a distinc-
tion between a father as next friend for a plaintiff-infant and a
father as guardian ad litem for a defendant-infant. In Thompson
v. Lassiter12 the plaintiff who had been guardian ad litem for his
son was barred in his suit for medical expenses and loss of earnings
and services of the minor because the son had been found negligent
in the first action. Indicating that as guardian ad litem the father
would make more effort than as next friend, 3 the court said that
"in legal effect, the distinctions are substantial and not merely
formal .... "114
Even if a liberal test for finding control is adopted, the fact re-
mains that a second suit must be instigated to determine the exis-
tence of control, which means additional court time with the attendant
expense and inconvenience.' 5 Other approaches are available and
should be considered.
A minority of jurisdictions have adopted a derivative approach.1°
That is, if the infant is unable to establish liability on the part of
the defendant, then any cause of action that the father might have
'RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84, comment f (1942).
"'Id. at comment e.
,Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82
(3d Cir. 1941).
-246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957).
"3 It would seem that if the infant is totally dependent upon his father,
if they are living under the same roof, and if the infant is totally dis-
abled, the likelihood of the burden of support after majority will rest upon
the father. With this in mind, a father as next friend may well have a
greater interest in his infant's claim for permanent injuries than he would
in defending, as guardian ad litem, an infant who is, for instance, protected
by liability insurance.
' Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 38, 97 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1957).
" Whether or not the father exercised control in the first suit could well
involve questions of fact requiring a jury and subject to appeal so that, in
fact, the blessing could become an added burden. The possibility is also
present that a father with reservations about the soundness of his and the
infant's claims could insure a second trial by systematically and consciously
avoiding participation in the infant's suit.
1 See Jones v. Schmidt, 349 Il. App. 336, 110 N.E.2d 688 (1953);
Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952);
Zarba v. Lane, 322 Mass. 132, 76 N.E.2d 318 (1947); Reilly v. Rawleigh,
281 N.Y. Supp. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Boyett v. Airline Lumber Co., 277
P.2d 676 (Okla. 1954) ; Wheng v. Hong, 206 Ore. 125, 290 P.2d 185 (1955);
67 C.J.S. Parents & Child § 41 (1950).
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had fails to mature. As one court has expressed it: "The mere
fact that a parent has sustained damages . . . does not give the
parent a cause of action. Such cause of action of the parent is
derivative to the extent that if the child cannot recover neither can
the parent."' 7 This approach is reasonable in that a defendant is not
called upon a second time to prove fully adjudicated facts. It should
be noted, however, that in the converse situation where the plaintiff-
infant wins in the first suit the defendant is not bound by the
results.' This is because the father must still prove that he has
suffered damages' 9 or because his burden of proof may be greater.20
As seen above, in both the majority and minority approaches to
infant-parent suits, a second trial is often necessary. This duplica-
tion could be eliminated if the statutory requirement that all causes
must affect all parties21 were changed to permit or require joinder
of the two actions.22 The court has, in fact, already judicially modi-
fied the joinder rule by holding that the father waives his rights to a
separate suit if the child, with the father's knowledge, claims dam-
ages, which would normally be the father's, and the defendant does
not enter a timely objection 23 If the statute is modified to permit24
joinder in all infant-parent causes of action, the rights of the parties
can be protected in one suit and costly litigation avoided.
" Pokeda v. Nash, 47 N.Y.S.2d 954, 957 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
"Holden v. Bloom, 314 Mass. 309, 50 N.E.2d 193 (1943); Annot., 32
A.L.R.2d 1060 (1953).
" McCray v. Earls, 267 Ky. 89, 101 S.W.2d 192 (1936).
" Hinckley v. Capital Motor Transp. Co., 321 Mass. 174, 72 N.E.2d 419
(1947).
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953).
2 This approach has been urged in an extended article where adoption
of the substance of the federal joinder rules was seen as a solution to many
illogical results, as illustrated by the infant-parent cases. Brandis, A Plea
for Adoption by North Carolina of the Federal Joinder Rides, 25 N.C.L.
REv. 245 (1947). Judge Goodwin of Oregon states:
As a matter of abstract public policy, and, indeed, of common sense,
there is much to be said for the proposition that one trial is enough.
Assuming the desirability of combining the two cases in one trial,
before one jury, the solution lies in a joinder procedure, rather than
in collateral estoppel. Joinder would insure the right of each party to
protect his own interest. That matter, however, is one for the legisla-
ture.
Wolff v. DuPuis, 233 -Ore. 317, 323, 378 P.2d 707, 710 (1963).Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534 (1948).
24 To accomplish the most desirable results, the word "permit" should be
construed to mean, in these cases, that the father inust be joined if he can be
served. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 511 (Wright ed. 1961).
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It is submitted that the present rule in these cases should be
altered. The adoption of a control test will work toward a desirable
end, particularly if liberally applied, but as indicated above, two
suits will still be required. The minority view, whereby the parent's
action is derived from the child's and must fall if the child fails,
would be an improvement, but it also sometimes requires two trials.
It is urged that the best solution is in a statutory revision to permit
joinder, giving all of the parties their day in court, while at the
same time eliminating a costly second trial.
PnILIp G. CARsoN
Taxation-Deductions of Rental Payments after Gift and Leaseback
to Short-Term Trust-Taxation of Income
Taxpayers may use the gift and leaseback device to effect tax
saving with greater confidence as a result of a recent decision of
the Tax Court of the United States.1 The gift and leaseback has
been popular among some taxpayers in high income brackets, chief-
ly physicians, as a method of reducing income taxes while boosting
total family income.2 Its popularity began to decline, however, when
the Tax Court held in I. L. Van Zandt3 that a noncorporate tax-
payer had to show a "business purpose" for making a gift of real
estate to a trust before he could validly deduct rental payments
made to the trust on leaseback of the property.4
1Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. No. 48 (July 6, 1965).
The popularity of the gift and leaseback is reflected by the amount of
litigation it has generated. Notable successes include Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v.
Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); Commissioner v. Greenspun,
156 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1946), on remand, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1948);
Alden B. Oakes, supra note 1.
40 T.C. 824 (1963), af'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
814 (1965), 86 Sup. Ct. 32 (1965).
'The court said:
Since deductions are matters of legislative grace and the taxpayer
has the burden of proving he is entitled to them, the petitioner here
must establish that the rental payments were in fact "ordinary and
necessary" expenses in his medical practice. While they may be
ordinary, were they necessary under these circumstances? We think
not. The petitioner owned and used the building and medical equip-
ment in his "trade or business" before he ever created the trusts,
transferred the property to the trusts, and then leased it back. Actual-
ly he continued to use the property in exactly the same manner he
had before these transactions were arranged and carried out. This
indicates a lack of any business purpose, which we believe is implicitly
required by section 162(a).
40 T.C. at 830-31. (Emphasis added.)
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